Fault-tolerance is crucial to maintain safety in offshore operations. The objective of this paper is to show how systematic analysis and design of fault-tolerance is conducted for a complex automation system, exemplified by thruster assisted Position-mooring. Using redundancy as required by classification societies' class notations for offshore position controlled vessels, the paper shows how violations of normal behaviour of main components can be detected and isolated. Using a functional service philosophy, diagnosis procedures are auto-generated based on provable correct graph analysis methods. Functional faults that are only detectable, are rendered isolable through an active isolation approach. Once functional faults are isolated, they are handled by fault accommodation techniques to meet overall control objectives specified by class requirements. The paper illustrates the generic methodology by a system to handle faults in mooring lines, sensors or thrusters. Simulations and model basin experiments are carried out to validate the concept for scenarios with single or multiple faults. The results demonstrate that enhanced availability and safety are obtainable with this design approach. While methods are introduced at a tutorial level, the paper is original by providing a total Position-mooring system design that ensures resilience to any single fault and to selected multiple faults. 42 tion an issue of special concern. The present problem is hence significantly more 43 complex, yet also more realistic than earlier research. The study is made generic 44 and realistic to the maritime industry through considering the instrumentation 45 2 that is required by classification societies.
Introduction
1 Safety and cost effectiveness are primary concerns for positioning control 2 systems for marine vessels Gray and Macdonald (1982) ; Chen et al. (2009) . 3 Frequent shutdowns of the whole control system when simple faults occur are 4 costly and high risk events for humans, for equipment and for environment. [p , ψ] position and heading F i thrust from i th thruster h = [z, φ, θ] heave, roll and pitch of the vessel M body mass matrix including hydrodynamic added mass N m , N t , N p number of mooring lines, thrusters and position sensors N g , N v , N w number of horizontal -, vertical gyroscopes and anemometers ν = [u, v, r] velocity vector of the vessel in the body-fixed frame ω = [p, q, r] angular velocity of body p = [x, y] North-East position vector in Earth-fixed frame ψ, r yaw angle and yaw rate of the vessel R nb (ψ) yaw rotation from body to navigation frame T j , T xy j tension in jth mooring line and its horizontal component u i command shaft speed to i th thruster v w , v c wind and current velocity vectors ARR analytical redundancy relation AUTS, AUT, AUTR DNV-GL class notations for DP CUSUM cumulative sum DP dynamic positioning FTC fault-tolerant control FPSO floating production storage and offloading GPS global positioning system HPR hydro-acoustic position reference MSO minimial structurally overdetermined PM Position-mooring with thruster assistance RPM revolutions per minute When considering fault-tolerant control, we need an answer to the question: which overall functions (e.g. actuators and sensors) are healthy and available for use by the control system. We are not interested in localization of defects to particular sub-components, as is the case for condition monitoring and maintenance systems. Modelling therefore need be done at the level of overall functionality. Such modelling is conveniently done using the principles of behavioural modelling Willems (1996) , where constraints c describe how certain variables are related. To introduce the notation, let variables be x, z and u, and let g s and g d denote functions; then constrains can be static (c s ) or dynamic (c d ) :
where g s and g d can be linear or nonlinear. Derivatives of variables can be 139 explicit or implicit in the constraints. Behavioural models are not necessarily 140 continuous, but the framework of static and dynamic nonlinear constraints fit 141 well with the physical modelling of a marine vessel.
142
While any symbol could be used for a constraint, we use a i for constraints 143 related to actuators, c i for a generic constraints within the system, m i for me-144 asurement constraints and d i for differential constraints. The 
where i = 1, ..., N t ; N t is the number of thrusters; u i is demanded propeller 148 speed; g p is the nominal relation between u i and the thrust obtained. The 149 thrusters contribute to control forces in surge and sway, and moment in yaw 
where j = 1, ..., N m and N m is the number of mooring lines. This constraint is the cable from 0 (anchor point) to L (top end point); x 1 (s) and x 1 (0) = 0, x 1 (L) = calculated from posture vector η,
x 2 (0) = 0, x 2 (L) = water depth.
We consider a rotatable turret mooring system in this paper. In this system, 168 the ship can rotate freely around the turret; therefore, manual rotation of the 169 turret is not considered.
170
Now consider the ocean current and wind disturbances acting on the vessel.
171
The vector of sea current velocity over ground is v c ∈ R 2 , relative wind is 172 v w ∈ R 2 , and ν ∈ R 3 is a vector with body-fixed velocities relative to water 173 in surge, sway and yaw. Roll, pitch and heave are not relevant for a moored 174 vessel. Wind load is described by a function g W (v w ). The kinetics of the vessel 175 in surge, sway and yaw is then, 
where R nb (ψ) is the horizontal rotation from body to North-East coordinates, 189 using the approximation that velocities are considered to be horizontal.
190
Using derivatives explicitly in the constraints, the differential operator need 191 be described as a relation between a variable and its time derivative,
3.3. Sensors available
193
The sensor devices onboard are: N g gyrocompass units for heading mea- 
where indices k, l, m, n, seek through a graph to determine how one could solve for unknown variables.
230
The result of a structural analysis is a receipt that, in symbolic form, describes 231 how unknown variables could be calculated from known variables, using the The salient feature of the structural analysis approach is that graph theory 236 exists that can be employed to find all possible ways the set of system constraints 237 9 can be matched to unknown variables. A theoretic procedure was shown in the 238 seminal paper Dulmage and Mendelsohn (1959 In the structural analysis approach, the variables in Eqs. (1) to (14) are 255 classified as unknown, known input and known measured variables, respectively
The technique analyses the principal relations between these types of vari- imply direction of causality, as illustrated in the structure graph (Fig. 1) . The 269 implication is that a variable must be solved for by following the direction of 270 the arrow. or more of the variables that are included in the constraint cannot be calculated 276 from the constraint, but others can, we define a direction of calculation in a 277 graph. As example in c :
performing the structural analysis. it is structurally isolable.
286
It is noted that the results from structural analysis are necessary but not 287 sufficient conditions for analytical property. E.g. the structural isolability does 288 not imply the isolability of a real fault while the isolability of a real fault does 289 imply the structural isolability. 
Relating velocity 295 to positionṗ = v therefore constitutes two uncoupled linear equations to which 296 the structural analysis tools immediately apply.
297
Transformation in the horizontal plane from body to navigation frame c : Convenience and concerns for brevity have dictated that vector notation is 311 used when possible in this paper. 
The structural analysis given the constraints in Table 4 with unknown va-317 riables listed in Eq.15 and known ones in Eqs. 16 -17. Analysis is done using 318 the SaTool software Blanke and Lorentzen (2006) where different algorithms are 319 available to find matchings and MSO sets. A set of analytical redundancy rela-320 tions (AAR) is generated as the result of the structural analysis. Each complete 321 matching or MSO set will define a set of relations, see Table 5 , that shows which 322 constraint is used to calculate each of the unknown variables. A 0 in the table 323 indicates an unmatched constraint that can be used as an ARR. 324 Table 5 : A complete matching of the AUT class system in Table 4 a 1 a 2 a 3 c 1 c 2 c 3 c 4 c 5 c 6 d 1 d 2 m 1
The complete matching of Table 5 gives a set of 9 ARRs. Each ARR provides 325 a balance that must be present between left and right hand sides of the ARR.
326
Forming the difference between the two sides of an ARR gives a residual, which 327 is zero, or close to, when no constraint in the ARR is violated; it is non-zero if 328 a constraint is violated.
329
For the AUT class system, the complete matching shown in 
arr 6 : 0 = m 6 (u 1 , u m1 ) (18) . . .
Replacing the left hand side zero in arr i : 0 = c j (. . .) by a residual r i provides The number of AAR's available from one complete matching is less or equal 344 to the number of constraints less the number of unknown variables, hence diffe-345 rent sets of residuals will be available for different DP class vessels, and detecta-346 bility and isolability properties differ as well. As example, Table 6 shows AUTS (2006) is an alternative where 96 AAR's are generated.
350
In general, detectability will be the same for the two ways of finding ARRs, 351 but isolability can be enhanced by using the MSO solution, at the expense of 352 running more ARRs in parallel than with the single matching set. In the DP 353 case, the use of MSO sets does not improve isolability for this particular system. 
This analysis has considered violation of one or more constraints. Some 383 physical faults may affect more than one constraint. In such cases, the multiple 384 violations are defined in the SaTool software and re-analysis is done. The symbolic form (Eq. 18) advise the way ARRs are to be calculated.
391
Inserting the analytical form of constraints hence makes it possible to auto-392 generate residuals. For the AUT class, N r = 9 residuals are auto-generated 393 in this way: r 1 . . . r 4 express a force balance of each of the mooring lines; r 5 394 the force balance on the vessel; r 6 . . . r 8 the difference between command and 395 measured rotational speed for each of the thrusters; r 9 the deviation between 396 the two position sensors.
397

16
The residuals read, in analytical form in the continuous time domain,
Physical faults 399
A physical fault f j impacting one but possibly a subset of the constraints 400 simultaneously,
In our case, physical faults of interest are: fault in any sensor; fault in any thrus-402 ter; fault in any mooring line, and according to Table 6 , each such component 
A fault is weakly detectable if a stable residual generator exists with the property: 415 ∃t 0 < t 1 < t 2 : ∀t t 0 , |f i (t)| = 0 ⇒ ∃t 1 , t 2 : |r(t)| = 0 for t 1 < t < t 2 . 
The reduction in variance due to filtering is easily calculated using standard methods, either by finding the resulting variance through integration, 
where µ 0i and σ 2 i are the mean and variance, respectively, and ∆µ i = µ 1i − µ 0i 455 is the change of the mean of the Gaussian sequence to be detected. When the 456 decision function g i (k) exceeds a threshold h, H 1 is assumed and an alarm is 457 triggered.
458
A very useful measure for design of a CUSUM test is the average run length 459 (ARL), see Basseville and Nikiforov (1993) . The ARL tells two essential things. The simulation and experiment setup are described in Section 6. second objective is usually achieved by the criterion that the distance between 523 the desired position of the vessel and the field zero point, p 0 , is less than a 524 critical value. The objectives are given as,
525
O : 
Faults in mooring lines
vessel's heading and adds damping in surge and sway, according to,
When faults as line breakage or wrong pretension occur in a mooring line, 592 the vessel will have another equilibrium position, and a minimum risk p d can be 593 calculated, see Fang et al. (2015) . If the vessel's drift is small, the controller in The vessel was first operated with a faultless mooring system and then with 689 a line breakage occurring in the mooring line 1 (Fig. 6 ). We will, in this East while that with FTC was almost unnoticeable. This is explained by the fact 733 that the FTC detected slow drift in the signal from the receiver 1; consequently 734 FTC disabled the GPS receiver 1 and used the receiver 2 for feedback. 
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Thruster failures 736
From the structural analysis with the assumption of disregarding fault detec-737 tor signal from the thruster, faults in thrusters are only structurally detectable 738 and not structurally isolable. The active isolation can be used to deal with these 739 detectable faults. In this technique, we will perturb the system with a sinusoi-740 dal signal from a thruster. From the structure graph ( Fig. 1) , we know that 741 tensions in all mooring lines will be affected if a perturbation signal is added to of the matrix is one then the corresponding tension measurement unit is faulty.
753
Simulations with a 'failure to zero' in thruster 1 is shown to validate the 754 active isolation and to demonstrate the thrust reallocation. There are three 755 cases in the simulations, a healthy and two faulty cases. The simulations and 756 model tests include cases with and without active isolation. The active isolation 757 was activated when a fault was detected but could not be isolated by the pas-758 sive diagnosis approach. The perturbations used for active diagnosis are here 759 sinusoidal signals. The dependency matrix was determined (see Table 12 ). The 760 active isolation dependency matrix shows that the fault was in thruster 1. residuals showed that several faults, including mooring line breakage or mooring 776 line tension sensor failure, were only detectable, whereas isolation is required to 777 make the control system take the correct remedial actions to faults.
778
Active isolation of faults was introduced to alleviate this problem. Statis-779 tical change detection was applied to determine when a fault had happened.
780
Time to detect and time between false alarm were used as design criteria for 781 change detection design in the presence of significant wave disturbances in the 782 signals. Fault accommodation and system reconfiguration methods were deve-783 loped for the different types of faults and control actions to handle faults were 784 demonstrated by model basin tests for selected faults with high severity.
785
Simulations and experiments were carried and multiple faults in mooring 786 lines, position measurement units and thrusters, and showed that FTC could 787 improve the performance and increase the safety of the vessel in the faulty 788 conditions.
789
The topic presented in this paper is essential for the design of autonomous 790 vessels since the principles presented are fundamental to achieve fault-tolerant 791 behaviours. Analysis of overall safety and analysis of risk related to such designs 792 36 will be interesting topics of further research.
